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ABSTRACT 	
!
This thesis explores the structure and maintenance policies of camps as forces driving 
gender-based violence. People in camps find themselves in a state of utter dependence on 
UNHCR or whatever state or NGO actor is providing for them. This experience deprives 
individuals of their identity and creates and environment that exacerbates gender-based 
violence. In order to effectively address this issue, perceptions of camps must change. 
While they are often considered temporary reactions to exceptional situations, they are in 
fact part of a larger policy implemented by developed countries to confine displaced 
people from the developing world to their own regions. Some form of camp is therefore a 
permanent reality, as there is no reason for them to vanish if the desire behind their 
creation never does. Once this policy of containment is recognized, ways of making its 
methods more humane can be explored. I propose an absolute right to work for all 
displaced people, promoted by both host states and UNHCR. By turning camp 
maintenance over to residents, UNHCR can better fulfill its mandate to protect refugees 
and reduce some of its financial burden. By allowing displaced people who cannot find 
work in camps to seek employment elsewhere, the host state will lessen its own financial 
burdens and benefit from displaced peoples’ contributions to its economy. Such a policy 
will, most importantly, return a sense of agency and identity to displaced people, thereby 
reducing GBV and making camps safer places for women and children.	
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I. INTRODUCTION:	
 !
Refugee women are more affected by violence than any other group of women in the 
world, and all refugee women are at risk of rape or other forms of sexual violence. 	
1
	
 	

Since the Syrian civil war began in the Spring of 2011, over two million Syrians have fled 
their country and sought refuge in neighboring states and abroad.  Hundreds of thousands 2
have wound up in camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. As the international media 
covers the conflict, horrendous pictures of the war have come streaming back, photos of 
children living out the winter in flimsy tents and horror stories about sexual assault and 
forced marriages have become the norm associated with the camps in which many 
Syrians find themselves. The deplorable conditions of camps in Jordan and Lebanon are 
no unique exception; poor living conditions, poverty, and high rates of violence are 
standard in many camps all over the world.  In situations of such hardship it is often the 3
most vulnerable, generally women and children, who suffer the most. Gender-based 
violence (GBV) in particular, is a serious problem that pervades most camps worldwide.  	
4
A natural inclination would be to blame high rates of GBV on a perceived lack of 
law and order and the resultant chaotic nature of camps. High crime rates, rampant 
abuses, and the lack of any justice system in place to protect camp residents, gives the 
perception that such zones fall outside the legal realm. However, camps are far more 
ordered than they often appear. While international refugee law (IRL) does not address 
camps, they are often provided for and legalized by the domestic law of the countries that 
create them. Additionally, residents’ lives are tightly controlled and regulated by various 
laws and policies implemented by states, the United Nations High Commissioner on 
  	  i
 LIZ REFUGEES MILLER, THE IRONY OF REFUGE: GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST 1
FEMALE IN AFRICA, AT 77.
 Syrian Regional Refugee Response, (2014), http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/2
regional.php (last visited Jan 18, 2014).
 Edward Rueda, Photos Reval Living Conditions within Refugee Camps, AL JAZEERA 3
AMERICA, February 4, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/consider-this/
Consider-This-blog/2014/2/4/photos-of-the-unknownrefugeecrisis.html.
 RADHIKA COOMARASWAMY, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST REFUGEES (1995), at 1.4
Refugees (UNHCR) and their various non-governmental organization (NGO) partners, all 
of whom contribute to the management of many camps. 	

Many researchers have pointed out the detrimental psychological consequences of 
confining people to camps. Additionally, extensive research has linked feelings of 
frustration, lack of agency, and loss of identity within the family, experienced by men to 
rising rates of GBV. Field research conducted in the Kanembwa camp in Tanzania links 
such experiences directly to the nature of life in the camp. It concluded that the forcing of 
camp residents, particularly men, into a state of utter dependence on UNHCR and NGOs, 
contributed to high rates of GBV within the camp. If such facts are the reality on the 
ground, an understanding of the phenomena of camps is needed to find ways of 
combating such a cycle. 	

This paper explores two alternative ways of understanding the existence and 
maintenance of camps, each of which points toward different solutions to the problem of 
GBV. Camps are often perceived as temporary havens – understaffed, underfunded places 
where people seek temporary refuge from the violence raging in their home countries. 
They are seen as safe places gone bad, that would be secure and livable if there were only 
enough funds and staff to properly maintain them. 	

An alternative way of understanding camps is to see them as walls: part of a 
deliberate policy to prevent large numbers of displaced people from making their way to 
the developed world. The implication of this analysis is that camps are anything but 
temporary. While individual camps may, on occasion, close, others will undoubtedly 
open. They are the solution that the international community has chosen to deal with 
situations of mass influx. In this scenario, camps are understood as permanent 
mechanisms of containment. 	

This paper argues that it is the latter description of camps that is, unfortunately, 
the more accurate, and realizing this can pave the way to crafting effective solutions to 
GBV. If the fact that Western States have an overwhelming desire to confine displaced 
people to their regions is recognized, then mechanisms can be explored to make the tools 
of such inevitable containment more humane. This paper advocates for a fundamental 
change in the creation and maintenance of camps, namely the absolute right to work for 
all camp residents in an effort to make camps largely self-sustainable. Such a process   	  ii
requires actions on several fronts and I argue that both states and UNHCR have an 
obligation to promote the full realization of the right to work. There are also benefits to be 
gained, such as the growth of local economies and the reduction of the massive costs 
expended by UNHCR and states. More importantly, such a policy would enable camp 
residents to support themselves and their families, restoring some sense agency and 
identity that is being taken away by the current structure of camps. While not a complete 
answer the problem of GBV, this process would help bring down such violence and make 
camps safer places for women and children. 	

No discussion of camps and international law should be had without first 
acknowledging the violations committed in the creation of camps themselves. While 
there are exceptions, most camps today are considered “closed camps”, meaning their 
residents are not allowed to leave and are arrested if they do.  The very creation of such a 5
camp is a violation of freedom of movement. Furthermore, their location in remote areas 
with no access to integration or employment leads to a host of other human rights 
violations.  For these reasons, Guglielmo Verdirame has argued that camps are almost 6
always illegal, with the rare exception being when they are truly a short-term emergency 
response, “if there is a refugee camp, there will be, inevitably, a human rights violation. 
Refugee camps are therefore always illegal because they can only be established and 
maintained in breach of human rights.”  	
7
Even the so-called “open camps”, whose residents are legally permitted to leave, 
are less flexible than they sound, as humanitarian aid is usually concentrated in one area 
far from urban cities, thus encouraging displaced people to stay in a designated place. 	
8
	
 This paper is not meant to condone or promote the creation of camps. Nor is it 
meant to pardon developed states’ discriminatory policy of containment that has caused 
  	  iii
 MAJA JANMYR, PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN REFUGEE CAMPS: UNABLE AND UNWILLING 5
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GUARDIANS? (2011) at 240-241. 
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the creation of camps to begin with. It simply assumes that saying camps are illegal and 
immoral, while an important and laudable task, is not enough. While we all wish camps 
would simply disappear, they are nevertheless increasing in number by the year and the 
desires of wealthy, powerful states to keep displaced people as far away from their 
borders as possible is unlikely to change. In this context, this thesis merely seeks to shed 
light on this reality in the hopes of making it more tolerable for those most affected. 	

	
 Before a discussion on camps, refugee law, and the right to work commences, a 
few definitions need to be provided. The term “refugee camp” is often used to describe 
the supposedly temporary settlements where displaced people find themselves. However 
this term is technically inaccurate as the vast majority of those in camps are not 
recognized refugees (this is explained in detail below). Therefore this thesis will refer to 
such settlements simply as “camps” to avoid any confusion. 	

There is no legal definition of a “camp”. Camps are not mentioned specifically in 
any of the four main IRL instruments: The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1951 convention), its subsequent 1967 Protocol (1967 protocol), the 1969 
Organization for African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa (OAU convention) or the Cartagena Declaration. This paper will use 
the definition developed by six international organizations, including UNHCR, which 
defines a camp as:	

a variety of camps or camp-like settings – temporary settlements including 
planned or self-settled camps, collective centers and transit and return centers 
established for housing displaced persons. It applies to ongoing and new 
situations where due to conflict or natural disasters, displaced persons are 
compelled to find shelter in temporary places. 	
9!
Camps are established in many different ways in many different countries. Some camps 
are closed, while others allow their residents to come and go freely. Some countries 
hosting camps have signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and multiple international 
human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, while others have not. Additionally, some states run camps themselves, 
while others turn some or all control over to UNHCR. Since it is impossible to formulate 
  	  iv
 Id. pg. 103, (citing The Camp Management Toolkit, (2008), http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9
9295458.pdf). 
one analysis that applies to all camps in all settings, this thesis focuses on closed camps, 
run (at least in part) by UNHCR, in countries that have signed the 1951 Convention. 	

	
 Another term that must be clarified is “refugee”. “Refugee” in the legal sense is a 
status that entitles an individual to a particular type of international protection.  It was 10
originally defined in the 1951 Convention, and the definition was then broadened by the 
1967 protocol, the OAU convention, and the Cartagena Declaration.  The consequences 11
of these various definitions will be explored later in this paper. At this point it is simply 
important to point out that the vast majority of those residing in camps are not recognized 
refugees and therefore are therefore not protected by IRL. However UNHCR’s mandate 
is significantly larger and the organization concerns itself not only with recognized 
refugees, but also asylum seekers, internally displaced people (IDPs), stateless people, 
and returnees.  As this thesis is concerned with people in camps, regardless of whether 12
they fall into any or none of these categories, for simplicity’s sake the term “displaced 
people” is used to refer to all those living in camps. Only those fulfilling the legal 
definition of “refugee” will be referred to in this thesis as refugees. 	

!
!
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!
II. CAMPS AS ZONES OF EXCEPTION	

I left early in the morning with about 20 other girls…we walked for some time. 
After about three hours we were at the bottom of the mountains and we started to 
collect the wood. We were near the village of Ablagulla, there are Arab fariks 
(temporary settlements) nearby. There were five men, they were armed, two of 
them had green uniforms and three had black or brown trousers. We saw them 
only when they came running toward us. They were shouting at us, saying that we 
were the wives of the Toro Boro (Sudanese armed group or Chadian self-defence 
groups operating in eastern Chad) Everybody started running in different 
directions. I was caught. 	
13!
A. Sites of exceptional violence:	

Camps are strange places. Sites of violence and suffering that seems uncontrollable, they 
are places of exception. Many have extraordinarily high rates of crime, including gender-
based violence (GBV). Statistics of GBV in camps are notoriously difficult to come by. 
However, a few reports are worth mentioning. 	

	
 Reports of sexual assault against Burundian displaced people in Tanzanian camps 
stated that over 25 per cent of women and girls experienced sexual violence while living 
in the camp.  In camps in Thailand, rape and domestic violence were the most common 14
kind of criminal offence perpetrated in the camp.  UNHCR staff working in Sudan 15
observed that female residents were subjected to more domestic violence in the camps 
than they would have experienced in their homes in Southern Sudan.  After a massive 16
  	  vi
 CHAD: NO PROTECTION FROM RAPE AND VIOLENCE FOR DISPLACED WOMEN AND GIRLS IN 13
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REFUGEE CAMPS, (2000), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/tanzania/.
 In Thailand, UN Agency opens first Legal Assistance center for Burmese Refugees, (2006), 15
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 Jeff Crisp, A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya’s Refugee 16
Camps, AFR. AFF. 601–632 (2000), at 625.
earthquake hit Haiti in 2010, thousands fled to displacement camps in Port-au-Prince. The 
sexual assault rate in such camps was 20 times higher than it was in the rest of the city.  	
17
While statistics may be hard to gather, there is no denying that women and girls in 
camps are extraordinarily vulnerable to GBV, and that sexual assault, harassment, and 
domestic violence are serious problems in most camps.  	
18
The causes of the problem are generally identified as being linked to inherent 
factors of displacement and conflict. UNHCR has cited dependency, loss of security, 
disrupted roles within the family and community, breakdown of the family unit, cultural 
practices that place women on unequal footing to men, and drug and alcohol use.  There 19
is merit in every one of these explanations, and various programs have been constructed 
to address the different factors. For example, in camps in Chad, many women were raped 
on their journeys outside the camp to collect firewood.  In camps in Somalia and Darfur, 20
women were not only being raped when they left the camp to get supplies, but also when 
the camps were raided by armed men from the nearby war zones.  In response, security 21
guards were added to the camp border to discourage the raids, and programs were 
implemented to bring the firewood to inhabitants in the camp. However despite these 
  	  vii
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 SEEKING PROTECTION: ADDRESSING SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN TANZANIA’S 18
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 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 17.19
 CHAD: NO PROTECTION FROM RAPE AND VIOLENCE FOR DISPLACED WOMEN AND GIRLS IN 20
EASTERN CHAD.
 Id. 21
seemingly logical solutions, the number of reported sexual assaults remained largely 
unchanged. 	
22
	
 In another attempt to reduce GBV, UNHCR and NGOs have often introduced 
women’s empowerment and educational programs to try to change cultural perceptions 
surrounding women, their traditional roles, and place in society. However just as in the 
case of the security solution, the GBV rate did not go down. In many cases the number of 
sexual assaults being reported actually went up.  This can partly be attributed to the fact 23
that empowerment programs encouraged women to report incidents of GBV that they 
might not otherwise have. However there is still a consensus that actual rates of GBV 
rose after the implementation of such programs. 	
24
	
 At this point it is important to emphasize that attempts to analyze the root causes 
of GBV must not be construed as excuses or justifications for perpetrators’ behavior. 
Furthermore, programs that alter cultural perceptions of women, such as women’s 
empowerment or educational programs do not lose their importance and value because 
they have not significantly reduced GBV rates. Rather these are vitally important 
initiatives in creating a more egalitarian society in the future, where, in theory, GBV 
would be less common. However as an immediate response to GBV, they are not the 
ideal solution, largely because they are generally geared toward affecting the minds of 
women, not the traditional perpetrators of GBV. Therefore, there is a need to analyze 
some of the root causes driving GBV in an attempt to craft solutions that truly reduce its 
rate. 	

GBV is an incredibly complicated problem that does not have one simple 
solution. Furthermore, given that it is not limited to camps but rather prominent 
throughout most societies and across different living situations, it is impossible to 
identify one, or even several, “cures” that would eliminate the problem. The point here is 
to examine one of the many driving factors behind GBV in camps; namely the status of 
  	  viii
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 Barbra Lukunka, New Big Men: Refugee Emasculation as a Human Security Issue, 50 INT. 23
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dependency and resultant loss of agency and identity experienced by camp residents. 
While this factor is not the sole culprit, it is worth taking into account as it is inherent in 
most camp structures and is often overlooked by aid groups working to combat the GBV 
crisis. 	

It is important to note that, while this thesis does not directly address GBV 
committed by camp workers, it acknowledges that such a phenomenon is as pervasive as 
it is disturbing. Sexual assault and abuse committed by aid workers has a long, dark 
history and most certainly requires further investigation and preventative action.  This 25
paper, however, focuses mainly on GBV committed by camp residents, particularly 
domestic violence. 	

There is a well-established link between men’s loss of agency and identity and 
violence, particularly GBV and its most common form, domestic violence. GBV is 
described by feminists as, “violence which embodies the power imbalances inherent in 
patriarchal society.”  Those power imbalances can be produced through a variety of 26
things, but of particular relevance here are the issues of conflict and structure. The 
concept of structural violence was created by Johan Galtung, who maintained that, 
“violence exists whenever the potential development of an individual or group is held 
back by the conditions of a relationship, and in particular by the uneven distribution of 
power and resources.”  According to Galtung: 	
27
The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and 
consequently as unequal life chances… Thus, when one husband beats his wife 
there is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million husbands keep one 
million wives in ignorance there is structural violence. 	
28!
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From a gendered perspective, “Depressed wages and high unemployment among male 
bread-winners destabilizes relations in the family.” 	
29
A key to understanding this destabilization is in recognizing that, in most cultures, 
male identity is tied to the ability to work and provide for one’s family. A study 
conducted for the World Bank on masculinity in Africa describes how men’s identities are 
often dependent on their ability to earn money and provide for their families. Without 
being able to work and provide financial security for their future brides, men are not 
allowed to marry and are not considered men. Young men in an IDP camp interviewed for 
the study tied their identity as men directly to their ability to work as farmers. Without 
land to work, they said, they could not consider themselves men.  This is supported by 30
the fact that hundreds of thousands of men travel miles across Africa every year in search 
of employment.  	
31
This sense of male identity is seriously jeopardized in camps. The lives of 
displaced people in camps are ones of dependence. Deprived of their home, often having 
left most of their possessions behind, and living in places of temporary shelter where 
employment opportunities are few to none, displaced people are entirely dependent on 
UNHCR and other NGOs for every aspect of their lives. Men in a Tanzanian camp 
described UNHCR as a “better husband” to their wives because it was the organization, 
and not the men, providing food and shelter. In this way, the structure and maintenance of 
camps directly contributes to a loss of men’s agency and identity as breadwinners. This 
phenomenon contributes to heightened rates of GBV, particularly domestic violence:	

It has been pointed out in studies in several camps that the day-to-day role of 
women often changes little while the same cannot be said for their husbands who 
no longer are able to cultivate fields or engage in outside employment. The 
frustrations experienced by men can result in increased family tension and 
potential for violence…Refugee men may have a difficult time in accepting either 
  	  x
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the new role of women or their own inability to support fully their families. This 
loss of control may result in domestic violence, depression, and alcoholism.  	
32!
This theory is exemplified in a study conducted by Barbara Lukunka on GBV in the 
Kanembwa camp in Tanzania. She refers to the loss of male identity as “emasculation” 
and directly links it to a high rate of GBV within the Kanembwa camp. 	

Kanembwa was a camp opened by Tanzania and run by UNHCR in response to 
the violence against Hutus in neighboring Burundi. Lukunka attributed the emasculation 
of men in the camp, and by extension, the high rate of GBV in Kanembwa to four factors: 
1) the restrictions of movement enforced by the Tanzanian government, 2) the fact that 
displaced people were entirely dependent on UNHCR assistance for every aspect of their 
survival, 3) the implementation of women’s empowerment programs, and 4) the loss of 
family and community.  The Tanzanian government viewed Burundian displaced people 33
as a security risk and therefore kept them confined to the camp on the border and did not 
allow them to access Tanzania proper. UNHCR was responsible for providing for the 
basic survival of camp residents. 	

Before the camp refugees worked various jobs and many of them were farmers.  
In the camp setup, refugees were unable to farm or work other jobs they might 
have done prior to exile. Hence, men lost their identities as breadwinners to 
UNHCR. 	
34!
Women’s empowerment programs, while well-intentioned, often had unintended 
consequences.	

protecting women seems to have led to violence against them because of their 
“empowerment,” which altered their traditional gender role. Because gender roles 
are mutually defined, such alteration to women’s roles then impacted men by 
undercutting their dominance over women. Refugee women experienced different 
forms of violence including rape, domestic violence, and forced marriage, among 
many others. 	
35!
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The emasculation of men in Kanembwa had a direct and damaging effect on women in 
the camp. With no work to do and feeling disempowered and deprived of agency, men 
often took up drinking, which led to a rise in domestic abuse. One interviewee remarked, 
“There was no domestic violence in Burundi. Men had things to do in Burundi. Men have 
nothing to do in the camps but drink and so they beat their wives.”  As the author of the 36
study points out, it is unlikely that there was no domestic violence in Burundi. However, 
this statement points to the severity of the change in gender relations in the camp. It was 
clear to refugee women that men’s lack of activities and livelihoods led to a frustration 
that was then unleashed on women. 	
37
GBV violence in camps is, in part, caused directly by the structure and 
maintenance policies of those very camps. Many proposed solutions to GBV problems 
are ineffective largely because they do not address such policies. In this way, camps are 
exceptional. While GBV is by no means limited to camps, there are few other places that 
place residents in a state of complete and utter dependence, thereby depriving them of 
agency and identity.  	
38
!
B. Places of legal exception? 	

Not only are camps exceptional in the way their structures contribute to high rates of 
GBV, they are also unique in their relationship to law. Camps can appear, at first glance, 
to sit in a legal void. While they are located in host states, the domestic judicial system is 
largely inaccessible to their residents. Due to a lack of financial resources, states often 
solicit the help of UNHCR in the running of the camps.  UNHCR and their partner 39
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 The main exception to this would be detention centers and prisons, which also have very 38
high rates of sexual violence. 
 The delegation of many refugee-related tasks to UNHCR is a common practice, even 39
among states that do not confine their refugees to camps. UNHCR often conducts refugee 
status determination and resettlement processes in states that do not have the financial 
resources or political will to do so themselves. 
NGOs then often become de facto sovereigns of the camp, developing most policy that 
affects the day-to-day life of camp residents:	

As most refugee movements occur in the developing world, and developed states 
increasingly adopt non-entrée measures, the legal burden of protecting the vast 
majority of the world’s refugees is shouldered by developing countries who do not 
have the wherewithal to fulfill this legal obligation. As a result, these refugees 
invariably live in conditions of insecurity and deprivation, reliant on whatever 
protection and assistance is provided by agencies like UNHCR. 	
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 Given this apparent legal muddle, it is important to clarify what laws do and do not apply 
to camps and their inhabitants. The legal situation of camps can be discussed on two 
levels: the creation of the camp, and the policies that govern life within the camp setting. 	

International refugee law (IRL) places the legal responsibility for displaced 
people squarely on the host state.  A particularly relevant responsibility enshrined in 41
both IRL and International Human Rights Law is non-refoulement. Article 33 of the 1951 
Convention states:	

No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion. 	
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This principle is also articulated in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and is arguably part of customary 
international law. 	
43
In situations of mass influx states turn to camps as a way of coping with the 
massive numbers and addressing their own security concerns about large numbers of 
incoming arrivals. UNHCR, understanding that situations of mass influx created a 
problem for neighboring states, and wanting to ensure that those states did not resort to 
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refoulement in response to such a crisis, acknowledged that camps might be the only way 
states could abide by their non-refoulment obligation under the Refugee Convention.  	
44
The 1951 Convention outlines further duties of the state toward refugees in its 
territory. However the application of the Convention is problematic when it comes to 
camp residents because most of its protections only apply to legally recognized 
“refugees” – a category into which many camp residents may not fall. The term “refugee” 
only legally applies to someone who:	

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.  	
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This definition is unlikely to include the vast majority of those in camps. Some states 
conduct their own refugee status determination (RSD) process, while others turn the task 
over to UNHCR. However regardless of who performs it, it is impossible for either actor 
to keep up in situations of mass influx. Furthermore, even if the state or UNHCR could 
conduct RSD fast enough, many camp residents would be denied refugee status. The 
1951 Convention definition does not include those fleeing war and conflict, generalized 
human rights violations, and natural disasters unless the individual suffers discrimination 
of the very specific type described in the Convention. Thus, those in situations of mass 
displacement are usually outside the Convention’s protection. The intentionally limited 
nature of the 1951 convention will be analyzed in the next chapter. 	

	
 Supplementing the 1951 convention are two regional IRL instruments: the OAU 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU 
Convention) and the Cartagena Declaration. The OAU broadens the 1951 convention 
refugee definition by including in the term “refugee”:	

every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination 
or evens seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his 
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country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual 
residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or 
nationality.  	
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The Cartagena Declaration further broadens the definition to include:	

persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety, or freedom have 
been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, 
massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously 
disturbed public order.” 	
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The OAU Convention and Cartagena Declaration are meant to work in tandem with the 
1951 Convention, meaning that any state that had signed both the 1951 convention and a 
regional instrument, is obligated to afford the protections outlined in the 1951 convention 
to all refugees, regardless of the definition under which they qualify. While using either 
definition would increase the number of camp residents that qualified as recognized 
refugees, situations of mass influx still render timely status determination impracticable. 	

	
 Articles 26 and 31 of the 1951 Convention are of particular importance to the 
confinement of displaced people to camps. Article 26 states:	

Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to 
choose their place of residence to move freely within their territory, subject to any 
regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances. 	
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Article 26 seems to prohibit camps outright, as inhabitants are usually prohibited from 
leaving camps. However this right is awarded only to those “lawfully in its territory”, a 
phrase that, while still debated, is generally assumed to not to apply to most individuals 
in camps. Article 31 concerns “refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge” and states in 
paragraph one:	

The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry 
or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1 [which defines “refugee”], enter 
or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present 
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themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal 
entry or presence. 	
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Paragraph two of the same article reads:	

The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees 
restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only 
be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission 
into another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a 
reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another 
country. 	
50
Article 31 is intended to ensure that asylum seekers are not punished for their often 
inevitable illegal entry.  Once an asylum seeker had either been determined to be a 51
refugee, or awarded some kind of official protection (such as a humanitarian visa or 
temporary protection visa) they are considered “lawfully in the territory” of their country 
of refuge and cannot be confined to a camp. However as has previously been stated, the 
inability of states or UNHCR to register everyone in camps limits the applicability of 
protections enshrined in IRL. Furthermore, in many camps, states do not even attempt the 
process of registering all residents and prohibit UNHCR from doing so. This is a 
violation of Article 31. In such cases, camp inhabitants’ statuses are never determined, 
excluding them from any of the protections outlined in IRL. 	

While the applicability of IRL to camps is limited given that its protections are 
contingent on some form of status determination, the application of IHRL does not face 
the same obstacles.  	

!
1. Camps and International Human Rights Law:	

 IHRL, by definition, applies to everyone, everywhere, and is contingent on no type of 
status recognition. The preamble of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) states:	

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of 
the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
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inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world…recognizing that these rights derive from 
the inherent dignity of the human person…	
!
Article 12 of the ICCPR states, “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, 
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his 
residence.” Restrictions on the right are only allowed if they are “provided by law, 
necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights or 
freedoms of others.”	

	
 Furthermore, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) states, 
“Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the 
borders of a State provided he abides by the law.” 	

	
 The standard of “lawfully within the territory” is slightly different in IHRL than it 
is in IRL. While IRL describes many different statuses, such as simply present, lawfully 
present, lawfully residing and habitually residing, IHRL simply distinguishes between 
lawfully present and unlawfully present. Technically, someone who crosses into a country 
illegally and is not granted asylum or some other type of visa is an illegal alien and states 
often use this fact to justify their restricting the freedom of movement of some displaced 
people. However, it is unjust to treat forcibly displaced people in the same way as other 
illegal aliens, as their entry is not voluntary. This is supported by the 1951 Refugee 
Convention’s prescription in article 31 that penalties must not be imposed on refugees for 
their illegal entry. This principle should be extended to other forcibly displaced peoples 
also.	

States also often use the national security exception outlined in the ICCPR to 
justify camps by claiming that the flow of such large numbers of unknown people poses a 
threat to state security. However Maja Janmyr and Verdirame have pointed out that the 
threshold for the national security argument is set quite high and requires a “particularly 
serious threat to the security state.”  Furthermore, Janmyr notes, “…the concentration of 52
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refugees in vast protracted camp setting in volatile border areas, and particularly within 
reach of armed groups, rarely addresses these security concerns in practice.”  	
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 Closed camps can also be considered places of detention,  and therefore 54
violations of article 9 of the ICCPR, which reads, “Everyone has the right to liberty and 
security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall 
be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure 
as are established by law.”  The Economic and Social Council’s Guiding Principles on 55
Internal Displacement declare the confinement of IDP’s to camps to be a form of 
detention.  The European Court of Human Rights has also ruled that a situation where an 56
individual was only allowed to leave a confined area with prior authorization and under 
supervision constituted one of detention. 	
57
Based on these principles, the creation of camps that confine their residents for 
years on end with no means of acquiring formal status and leaving the camp is almost 
always a violation of IHRL in itself. As Verdirame has argued, the violation of IHRL 
committed in the creation of the camp contributes to a host of IHRL violations that occur 
within the camp itself.  	
58
The delegation of camp management to UNHCR contributes to the lack of IHRL 
enforcement in camps. While states are responsible for adhering to their duties under 
IHRL (including, in theory, the protection of camp residents), it is often UNHCR who 
makes the majority of decisions regarding camp life. And given that UNHCR is a body of 
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the UN, an organization intrinsically bound up with the promotion of IHRL,  the 59
organization may seem to be in the best position to ensure rights articulated in IHRL are 
realized.  	
60
However UNHCR was conceived as a monitoring organization; created to 
observe states’ fulfillment of their obligations under the 1951 refugee convention. In 
order to operate in a country, it has to be invited by the state, and can be forced to leave at 
any time if the state withdraws its invitation.   It does not remotely resemble a sovereign 61
with the authority to implement law in its territory. Additionally, the organization is 
notoriously under-resourced and struggles to provide even the basics for displaced people 
in camps.  	
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 A further problem with expanding UNHCR’s mandate to enforcing law in camps 
is that the displaced people it would be governing do not elect the organization’s 
employees. The accountability of UNHCR is a serious problem that is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  Suffice to say that significantly expanding its activities would mean 63
giving more power to an unaccountable and unrepresentative international organization. 	

This is not to say that there is nothing UNHCR can or should do to promote IHRL 
in camps. Its obligations under IHRL and ability to fulfill them will be examined in 
chapter 3. The purpose here is merely to point out that the organization cannot shoulder 
the sovereign state’s responsibility to respect human rights within its territory.	

!
2. Camps and Domestic Law: 	

Most countries that house camps do so under the laws of their domestic systems. In April 
2014, Kenya mandated that all Somali displaced people living in Kenya proper return to 
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UNHCR-run camps through a legal decree.  Additionally, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, 64
and many other countries have specific domestic laws allowing for the confinement of 
displaced people to camps. In another example, while Australia does not confine its 
incoming displaced people to camps, it does often confine them to detention centers for 
years at a time. This is not in violation of Australian law. Rather, it is legally prescribed. 
Australia’s 1958 Migration Act allows all non-citizens without a valid visa to be detained 
until they either obtain a visa or leave the country. The law specifies no limit on the 
amount of time they can be held.  In this case, the unlimited confinement of migrants is 65
neither prohibited nor ignored by domestic law; it is instead directly enabled by it.  	

	
 The result of the interaction of these various legal spheres is a zone in which there 
is only one effectively implemented set of laws: domestic laws confining displaced 
people to camps. IRL’s application to camp residents is difficult because of the regime’s 
reliance on individual status determination to award protection and therefore inability to 
deal with situations of mass influx. While IHRL prohibits camps and, in theory, protects 
all displaced people, there is simply no mechanism to force states to adhere to their 
obligations. Additionally, states usually turn the management of camps over to UNHCR, 
an organization incapable of extending IHRL protection to camp residents. The result for 
displaced people in camps is that they remain in an exceptional zone, feeling only the 
effect of laws keeping them there, and lacking any form of meaningful legal protection. 
Not only are displaced people not protected in these places, but also the structure and 
maintenance of camps directly exposes them to GBV and other forms of violence. The 
recognition of these facets of camps is crucial to making any significant steps toward 
changing them. 	
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III. A POLICY OF CONTAINMENT 	
!
A. Camps as temporary safe havens: 	
!
It is important to examine the way camps are perceived by those who create and run 
them, as this perception greatly impacts the way they are generally perceived, and how 
problems inside them are addressed. 	

	
 Camps, in fact refugee situations as a whole, are perceived to be temporary. Most 
people assume that refugees want to and will return to their home countries after 
whatever circumstances causing their flight have been resolved. Camps in particular are 
seen as temporary solutions to crisis situations of mass influx. States frequently describe 
them as “temporary housing”  and it is generally assumed that they will be dismantled 66
and their residents will return home as soon as possible. 	

This sense of “temporariness” is exemplified in everything from the physical 
structure of camps to the maintenance policies surrounding them. The very creation of 
camps is often predicated on the assumption that their residents will only be there 
temporarily, as UNHCR often uses this argument to convince states to host incoming 
refugees.  	
67
	
 States’ obligations under international law have helped create this sense of 
temporariness. As has previously been stated, the protections outlined in the 1951 
convention only apply to recognized refugees – a category into which many displaced 
people do not fall. States’ obligations under the principle of non-refoulement, however, 
are broader. While refugee status is awarded to individuals fleeing persecution, on the 
basis of race, nationality, religion, political opinion, or social group, non-refoulement 
prohibits the return of anyone to a place where their life or freedom would be threatened 
on one of the above grounds. The limitation of the application of non-refoulement to 
those fleeing a convention grounds means many fleeing civil war or international armed 
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conflicts would not be protected. While “persecution” has been interpreted differently, it 
is generally considered a higher bar than the threatening of life or freedom. Additionally, 
while the 1951 convention applies only to those states that have signed it, the principle of 
non-refoulement is generally considered part of customary law , meaning it is binding 68
even on states that have not ratified the refugee convention. The net result is that many 
states are under an obligation to host or safely resettle many more people than those to 
whom they are obligated to grant asylum. This has led to a legal gap into which millions 
of displaced people (many of whom reside in camps) fall. 	

	
 There are several other factors that contribute to this gap. For one thing, once an 
individual has stated that they are seeking asylum, the state cannot deport them unless 
their asylum claim has been investigated and found invalid. States cannot either seal their 
borders or simply deport displaced people en masse because they could very well be 
violating the non-refoulement principle. Another barrier to mass deportation is the 
impracticality of deporting hundreds of thousands of people back to countries that are 
experiencing violent armed conflict. When roads, trains, ports, or airports are 
inaccessible, there is often no practical way of returning people, even if states want to. 
States’ non-refoulement obligations and the sheer impracticality of deporting people in 
mass help contribute to the previously described gap. 	

This gap has led to the concept of “temporary” protection, which is recognized as 
part of customary law.  Different countries deal with people not covered by the refugee 69
convention in different ways. Developed states with more financial resources and fewer 
displaced people to contend with often grant temporary protection visas to those who are 
not recognized refugees but cannot return to their home countries. Sometimes, such as in 
the case of Australia, developed states detain such people for indefinite periods of time. 
States in the Developing World, who have fewer financial resources and massive numbers 
of displaced people crossing their borders, often lack the financial resources or political 
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will to grant protection visas. They therefore turn to camps, hoping that their residents 
will remain there, lacking any legal status, for a short period until they can return home.	

 The European Union statement on the minimum standards for giving temporary 
protection states:	

This direction puts in place an exceptional scheme to deal with possible cases of 
mass arrivals in the European Union of foreign nationals who cannot return to 
their countries….the legislation puts in place immediate temporary protection for 
these displaced persons…  	
70!
The document further specifies a time period for the “temporariness” of such situations, 
stating, “the duration of temporary protection shall be one year and may be extended by a 
maximum of two years.”  In their 1981 Executive Committee Conclusions, UNHCR 71
further distinguished between a state’s actions when responding to an emergency 
situation of mass influx and their actions when accommodating displaced people long-
term:	

For situations of mass influx of asylum seekers, states, at a minimum, are to grant 
temporary asylum…Temporary asylum allows the receiving state to admit 
refugees without granting asylum. In granting asylum a state could be understood 
as providing a durable, permanent, solution, requiring the acceptance of 
permanent responsibility for persons of mass influx. Additional minimum 
standards of granting asylum require: 1) non-discrimination; 2) access of 
temporary asylees to the legal system of the country of refuge; 3) location of 
camps at a “reasonable distance” from the frontier of the country origin; 4) 
promotion of voluntary repatriation; and 5) unrestricted UNHCR access to asylum 
seekers to ensure international legal protection. 	
72!
The concept of temporary protection has filled a gap left by the limited nature of the 1951 
convention and the more expansive non-refoulement obligation. Through the acceptance 
and promotion of temporary protection as a solution for displaced people who do not 
qualify as recognized refugees, the understanding of refugee situations as temporary has 
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been reflected in the development of international and domestic laws and policies. This is 
further reflected on the ground in countries hosting displaced people. 	

Camp housing is often distinctly temporary, such as tents, and this is often a 
deliberate decision by states to enforce the camps’ “temporariness”. In 2012 UNHCR 
began building sturdy shelters for displaced people in the Daadab camp in Kenya because 
the situation there had been termed a “protracted refugee situation” by UNHCR. 
However a few months after construction began, Kenyan officials ordered UNHCR and 
its partners to stop, claiming that the housing “looked more like permanent dwellings 
than temporary shelters for refugees.”  This is in line with Kenya’s desire to prevent 73
displaced people from integrating:	

The Government of Kenya will not consider local integration for Somali refugees, 
or any other refugees for that matter…currently, their status is temporary and their 
mobility is constrained. 	
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The “temporariness” of mass influx situations is etched throughout international and 
domestic law, as well as UNHCR discourse and policy. While states that have signed the 
1951 convention and/or the OAU Convention are obligated to provide recognized 
refugees with a durable solution, they are under no such obligations when it comes to 
other forcibly displaced people. These individuals may be expelled and, where this is not 
possible – whether for legal, moral or practical reasons – they may be awarded some 
form of temporary protection or detained or confined to camps. 	

This sense of temporariness greatly impacts the way camps are run and how the 
problems within them are approached. If the situation is short-term, it is easier for 
UNHCR and other NGOs to solicit funds from donors. Donors are far more likely to give 
to emergency situations of mass influx that make the front page of the newspaper, than to 
protracted situations about which the public has largely forgotten. UNHCR and NGOs 
can also tell donors that, while massive funds are needed at the present time, the situation 
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is only temporary, a comforting assurance to those who would not want to be responsible 
for sustaining a more permanent installation. Large-scale funding is not only easier to 
acquire for termed “temporary situations” but its injection also makes more sense. Aid 
work can function as a band-aid – temporarily providing for people’s basic survival for 
the supposedly short period of time that they will need help. There is no need to take the 
extensive time required to investigate root causes or contributing structural factors of 
issues like GBV because the situation in which the problem is playing out will not last. 
Additionally, the diminution of male identity described in the first chapter does not occur 
overnight. When displaced people arrive in camps they are very often hungry, sick, and 
traumatized and may not be in a position to care for themselves. If these people are truly 
in camps for a few weeks or months, providing for them completely could be beneficial. 
However, over the long term such a state of dependence can become harmful.	

In temporary situations, there is also no need to investigate ways of making the 
camps self-sustainable because they are meant to be the exact opposite. And yet despite 
the overwhelming assumption and desire that camps will end as soon as conflicts do, 
camps, and many of the larger refugee situations of which they are a part, are anything 
but temporary. 	

!
B. Camps as permanent walls: 	

Two thirds of the world’s refugees are currently living in “protracted refugee 
situations” (PRS), most in the poorest regions of the world.  PRS are defined as 75
situations in which refugees have remained for more than five years, and they apply to 
most refugee situations worldwide.  In line with PRS, many camps have been in place 76
for years, often with entire generations living out their entire lives in them, “Refugees 
find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at 
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risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social, and psychological needs remain 
unfulfilled after years in exile.” 	
77
The misconception of the “temporariness” of camps comes from a 
misunderstanding of the cause of their creation. It is generally assumed that camps are 
created in response to certain conflicts (and will be dismantled as soon as those conflicts 
end). On a simplistic, purely practical level, this is true. Individual camps are created in 
response to individual conflicts. However on a broader, more systematic scale, the 
decision to create camps is not a result of an individual situation, but rather a deliberate 
policy initiated by Western countries to address Third World refugee situations as a 
whole. To illustrate this, camps must be explained as one aspect of the much larger 
picture of refugee law. 	

Despite its appearance as a noble attempt to protect the world’s most vulnerable 
populations, refugee law has always limited itself to protecting people who meet a certain 
criteria. Various regional instruments, such as the OAU convention, have broadened the 
original refugee definition. However only the countries that have signed such documents 
apply these expanded definitions. The U.S and Europe (not part of the African Union) 
continue to use only the limited definition provided in the 1951 refugee convention. Over 
time, such limitations have increased as Western states have been faced with different 
kinds of asylum seekers.  International Refugee Law (IRL) currently functions as a way 78
to confine displaced people to their regions, and camps are simply very effective means to 
that end. 	

IRL, even in its infancy, long before the 1951 convention, has always been a 
European product: 	

The first international legal standards governing the protection of refugees were 
designed by European states after World War I for the protection of European 
refugees; therefore, the role of refugee law reflected the political norms of 
European society.  	
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The 1951 refugee convention was drafted as a response to a specific refugee crisis: the 
Second World War. For this reason the original convention only applied to European 
refugees fleeing their home countries prior to 1951. 	

The 1951 convention defines a refugee as someone who:	

As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country…owing to such a fear, is unwilling to return to 
it.  	
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This specific definition was a response to the political situation at the time. In the 
immediate aftermath of WWII, the majority of the displaced people the drafters were 
seeing were fleeing persecution on racial or religious grounds. Furthermore, the 
discussions were overshadowed by tension between the Western and Soviet blocs, 
ultimately leading to the withdrawal of the Soviet delegation from the drafting process.  81
The convention was, therefore, an entirely Western product and the states ensured that it 
promoted Western objectives, “This phraseology was clearly adequate to comprise the 
traditional preoccupations of racial and religious minorities and would moreover bolster 
the condemnation of Soviet bloc politics through international law…”  	
82
While the 1967 additional protocol eliminated the textual geographical and 
chronological limitations of the 1951 convention, it did not change the type of person 
who qualified for status. Despite the geographical expansion in the protocol’s text, the 
international community’s primary concern regarding displaced people remained 
concerning those moving throughout Europe.  While the protocol on paper appeared to 83
apply to displaced people moving throughout Africa and Asia, its limited definition 
ensured many of them would never qualify for protection. The protocol therefore 
functioned to condone and strengthen the limited application of refugee status. 	
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The refugee definition established by the Protocol has enabled authorities in 
developed states to avoid the provision of adequate protection to Third World 
asylum claimants while escaping the political embarrassment entailed by use of 
an overtly Eurocentric refugee policy. 	
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The Convention and Protocol’s focus on the violation of civil and political rights was 
further strategic in that it identified a type of migrant that was more likely to come from 
one region and less likely to come from another. “Unlike the victims of civil and political 
oppression, persons denied even such basic rights as food, health care, or education 
(where the Western states have a poor record) are excluded from the international refugee 
definition…”  The majority of Soviet refugees during the Cold War were fleeing 85
government persecution on the basis of political opinion or imputed political opinion. 
However most displaced people moving throughout the Third World today flee for very 
different reasons. 	

While many flee political oppression from dictatorial regimes and thus may well 
fall under the convention, many more flee economic hardship.  Despite finding 86
themselves in often life-threatening situations in their home countries, they do not qualify 
as refugees. They are instead relegated to the category of “economic migrants” that are 
admissible and resident solely at the discretion of the host state. 	

From the convention’s drafting in 1951 until 1980, developed countries were 
largely unconcerned with Third World displaced people and focused primarily on victims 
of the Nazi and Soviet regimes. One reason for this was that these refugees were 
considered valuable to western countries. Many refugees from the former Soviet Union 
were intellectuals – professors, writers, artists, doctors, lawyers - who were fleeing 
persecution by the Soviet state. These refugees were highly educated, they had skills that 
could benefit any society into which they integrated and were therefore considered 
valuable to Western countries. Furthermore, the U.S and Western Europe had a particular 
political point to make regarding these refugees and the country from which they fled. 	
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IRL has often functioned as a vessel by which states express their support for, or 
disapproval of, another country. If a country approves of the actions of another state, they 
are often less willing to grant refugee status to asylum seekers fleeing its policies. On the 
other hand, if a state is unhappy with another country, they can express that by taking a 
broad reading of the refugee definition in the convention and granting status to as many 
people as can be seen to fit the definition. The U.S and Europe had a vested interest in 
showing their disapproval of the Soviet Union, as the Cold War was one fought as much 
through propaganda as physical force:  	

As anxious as the Soviets had been to refuse international protection to social and 
ideological immigrants for fear of exposing their weak flank, so were the Western 
states anxious to underscore the plight of dissidents from Communist regimes by 
bringing them within the scope of an internationally recognized refugee regime. 	
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Western countries therefore deliberately took a liberal reading of the convention and 
recognized as many soviet refugees as they could, thus showing their disapproval of the 
Soviet Union. “In the receiving countries of the West, anyone arriving from the Soviet 
Union or one of its allies was automatically granted some form of asylum; no detailed 
scrutiny of their reasons for leaving was felt necessary…” 	
88
Not only did the U.S and Europe actively seek to grant refugee status to Soviet 
asylum seekers, they also created a place for them in Western society. UNHCR has 
specified three “durable solutions” when it comes to refugees. That is, there are three 
possibilities for establishing permanent, lasting solutions for those who have fled their 
homes. The three options are voluntary repatriation (returning to one’s home country), 
local integration (integrating into their country of asylum) and resettlement (if a refugee 
cannot return to their home and is unable to integrate into their first host country, they 
may be relocated to a third country for a permanent solution). Up until the end of the 
Cold War, the most desirable durable solution, in the eyes of the U.S and Western Europe, 
was resettlement. Soviet refugees were welcomed into the U.S and Western Europe with 
little scrutiny and were offered permanent solutions.	
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In the past, the industrialized countries have advocated resettlement as a 
solution…indeed, it was the West which, in the period after the Second World 
War preferred resettlement to repatriation as a solution. Even when the policy of 
repatriation was formally adopted by the International Refugee Organization at 
the insistence of the Soviet Union, the solution of resettlement prevailed in 
practice. 	
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The combined result of all these factors was that most Soviet asylum seekers were 
quickly granted refugee status, resettled to U.S and Western European cities, and 
encouraged to integrate. There were no camps, no delays in refugee status determination, 
and no multitudes of people caught in limbo for decades. 	

The end of the Cold War marked end of the flow of predominantly white, male, 
adult, educated, “valuable” refugees, and the beginning of the flow of predominantly 
black, poor, female, young, and low-skilled ones.  The Cold War did not materialize as an 
armed conflict between the U.S and the Soviet Union, but rather as a series of proxy wars 
throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. As various African 
countries began gaining independence in the 1950s, the U.S and Western Europe 
provided military and financial support to friendly political leaders and initiated coups to 
dislodge unfriendly ones:  	
90
Africa, seething with anticolonial nationalism while under Western European 
imperial control, was viewed by American political leaders as one of the volatile 
regions outside Europe which appeared ripe for Soviet ideological expansion… 
Hence, the prevention of ideological and political penetration of the region by 
communism became a major objective of the U.S policy towards post-colonial 
Africa. 	
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Throughout the Cold War the U.S and Europe promoted their ideological agenda in 
Africa by supporting various dictatorial, and oppressive regimes. However after the war 
was over and these areas were no longer of such strategic value, support of such 
governments was withdrawn and the countries, simmering with ethnic and political 
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tensions, devolved into civil war. “After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, many Third 
World countries in Africa were left to fend for themselves, compelled to foot the bill for 
the West’s bloody extravagances and incompetence.” 	
92
 	
 These conflicts sent surges of displaced people fleeing across international borders 
and into neighboring states. In the 1990s for example, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, and Rwandan refugee numbers, which had been holding fairly steady at 
approximately 200,000 since 1985, skyrocketed to 800,000 over the course of two 
years.  Neighboring countries were not suited to receiving such massive numbers of 93
displaced people. Many of them were already recovering from, or engaged in conflicts of 
their own, suffering from political instability, and did not have the financial resources to 
support their own populations, let alone thousands of newcomers. The fact that these host 
countries were not going to be able to provide desirable living situations for incoming 
displaced people meant that those people would not likely want to stay there and might 
seek lives elsewhere.	

This created a dilemma for the U.S and Western Europe: their original policy of 
resettlement being the desirable durable solution would enable many of these refugees to 
be resettled in the West. However these new types of displaced people were not what the 
Western countries had envisioned when they devised the policy. They were, in general, 
poorer and less educated then their former Soviet counterparts. This meant that they were 
considered less valuable to Western society and the latter was less willing to take them in. 	

Additionally, after the Cold War was over, the West had less of a vested interest in 
publishing their disapproval (if there was any) of the actions of states from which 
displaced people were fleeing. In some cases, it would have been politically 
disadvantageous to Western states to recognize the actions of governments that were 
driving refugee flows:	

The strong political and economic links that exist between the West and many 
Third World states of origin have led to a predisposition to question the likelihood 
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that those states could reasonably be expected to engage in persecutory 
behavior. 	
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There was therefore no more reason to interpret an expansive definition of refugee status 
or publicize integration of refugees into Western societies:  	

A common view was that the needs of European refugees were the proper object 
of a universal convention, while the needs of non-European refugees ought to be 
dealt with by adjacent states. While European refugees required guarantees of 
rights in states of asylum or resettlement, it was argued that non-European 
refugees did not need legal protection. 	
95!
As a solution, the West relied on an already established perception that these new 
displaced people were distinctly different than the ones who had fled Nazi Germany and 
the former Soviet Union:  	

Once the Cold War ended, and refugees were no longer welcome in the North, the 
myth of difference was invoked to justify the institutionalization of the non-entree 
regime. By producing the image of a ‘normal’ refugee – white, male, anti-
communist – a clear message was sent to the population with regard to the ‘new 
asylum seeker’: that asylum seekers were here for no good reason, that they 
abused hospitality, and that their numbers were too large. 	
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They were economic migrants in disguise. This is illustrated perfectly in the rhetoric 
surrounding the creation of camps, as emergency responses to situations of exceptionally 
high influx. However this perception of difference, and extraordinarily high rates of 
movement is, exactly as Chimni describes, a myth: 	

The notion that the contemporary refugee crisis is unique lacks a historical 
perspective and neglects this important fact: mass refugee movements are neither 
new nor exclusive to specific regions. They have been an enduring and global 
issue throughout the twentieth century. Before the Second World War, the 
European continent experienced refugee flows similar to those taking place in 
Eastern Europe and the developing world today…the Second World War alone 
displaced a staggering number of people – more than thirty million. Even during 
the relatively peaceful Inter-war period, millions of people became refugees… in 
1926, for instance, an estimated 9.5 million were considered refugees. While the 
number of refugees is approximately the same as that of the refugee population of 
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1980, it is a proportionally larger figure because the world’s population doubled in 
the mean time. 	
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There is, in reality, nothing to support the claim that today’s refugee flows are 
unprecedented or exceptional: 	

Popular European belief seems to be based on the conviction that the present rate 
of intercontinental movements of immigrants is unprecedented in history. This is 
completely wrong. Taking a 200-year perspective from 1800 to 2000, by far the 
peak of migration was reached during the years 1845-1924, when 50 million 
people, mainly Europeans, moved to the Western Hemisphere at a time when 
world population counted only somewhat more than one billion.  	
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Not only did Western states promote the “myth of difference” they also sought to 
portray the states from which displaced people in the south were fleeing as responsible 
for the circumstances that led to their flight. By ignoring the fact that the conflicts that 
caused much of the refugee flow in the South were, in part, effects of Europe’s colonialist 
policies, and placing responsibility solely on the countries themselves, the West could 
promote the repatriation of displaced people. This encourages states to either attempt to 
adjust their internal policies so their citizens do not flee to begin with, or for neighboring 
states to take displaced people in.  	
99
The durable solution policy then officially changed, with the UNHCR executive 
committee, on encouragement from western states, began promoting voluntary 
repatriation instead of resettlement as the ideal durable solution: 	

While between 1912 and 1969 nearly 50 million Europeans sought refuge abroad 
all of them were resettled, at present the solution of resettlement is proposed only 
in the context of refugees having special needs. It is today offered to less than one 
per cent of the world’s refugees. Resettlement has, in other words, been replaced 
by voluntary repatriation as the ideal solution. 	
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The West’s reaction to mass population displacement was to try to contain it to the 
local region, and this policy has been further promoted by the ever-increasing mandate of 
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UNHCR.  While the organization was traditionally a monitoring one focused on 
individuals who fit the legal definition of a refugee, much of its current work is geared 
toward assisting “persons of concern”, many of whom are not refugees. UNHCR’s camp 
management activities fall under precisely this category. The expansion of UNHCR’s 
mandate has come with the incorporation and solidification of the two-tiered system 
differentiating refugees from other migrants. UNHCR’s acceptance of this distinction has 
meant that their assistance in the field varies greatly depending on who they are assisting: 	

Whereas the UNHCR routinely assists refugees (European and analogous groups) 
in securing asylum including third state resettlement, non-mandate (third world) 
persons of concern to UNHCR are typically assisted in ways that localize or 
confine their displacement. Such assistance may include, for example, food and 
shelter. 	
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UNHCR is also active in promoting voluntary repatriation as the most desirable durable 
solution, as it frequently encourages and assists refugees in returning to their homes and 
provides assistance for them when they do.  In this way UNHCR has been complicit in 102
the two-tiered protection system helping to further the West’s policy of containment. 	

While the West wanted to prevent displaced people from getting to their shores, 
that desire was echoed in the desire of local states. Overwhelmed with their own security 
and financial problems, they had no desire to allow displaced people to integrate in large 
numbers. The promotion of voluntary repatriation is an important contributing factor to 
the way the refugee situation looks today, particularly with relation to the existence of 
camps. 	

Camps are merely a method that address to the concerns of the U.S and Europe, 
as well as those of host countries in the region of conflict. The host states’ decision to 
confine displaced people to camps prevents them from integrating into society and keeps 
them in a living environment unpleasant enough to encourage them to return home. It 
further appeases Western states and their desire to restrict resettlement. Camps are usually 
packed full of people, some of whom fit the convention refugee definition and some who 
don’t. But because of the sheer number of people residing in camps, it is usually 
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impossible for UNHCR to conduct the RSD process in any kind of timely fashion. In the 
Kakuma camp for example, many asylum seekers who had arrived in 2003 had not had 
the chance to even begin the RSD process by 2009.  And because resettlement is only 103
available to refugees recognized under the 1951 convention, very few have access to the 
process, and on the off chance that they do, it too is incredibly delayed. The result is that 
displaced people often spend years, sometimes lifetimes or even generations, in camps. A 
study found that the average time a refugee spent in a camp was 17 years,   “The strong 104
emphasis on the return, local resettlement, or confinement in camps of displaced people 
in the less developed world contrasts markedly with the “exilic bias” of the Convention-
based refugee law applicable to Europeans.” 	
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Camps function as walls. They are not temporary safe havens, but permanent 
barriers designed to confine Third World displaced people to the global south, preventing 
them from getting to the U.S and Europe. This fact ensures their permanence. While 
individual camps are created because of an individual conflict, the phenomena of camps 
and their increasing use has little to do with local circumstances that could change. They 
are not a response to an individual conflict that could end, but rather to the permanent 
desire of the U.S and Europe to confine displaced people within their own regions. And 
since the driving desire behind their creation shows no sign of disappearing in the near 
future, camps, the result of this desire will not end. 	

The recognition of this fact is important because it could change the way camps 
are maintained. UNHCR regularly sites lack of resources as a reason living situations in 
camps are so dire. The longer camps last, the less likely donors are to give money to 
support them.  Neither states nor UNHCR have the resources or the desire to sustain 106
camps for an indefinite amount of time. If camps’ permanence is recognized, states and 
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UNHCR would have more of an incentive to make them self-sustainable. If camps were 
built to last long term, it would be in the host state’s and UNHCR’s best interest to make 
them as livable and sustainable as possible, as the worse their conditions, the harder it is 
to indefinitely confine their inhabitants. If livability and sustainability were the goals of 
states and UNHCR when establishing camps, discussions could be had on root causes of 
problems such as GBV, in an attempt to ensure that camps were as safe for their 
inhabitants as possible. The current perception of camps as temporary prevents UNHCR 
and states from devising effective ways of making them as tolerable as possible. Camps 
should be recognized for what they are: permanent, confining, and increasing in number.	

!
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IV. MAKING THE PERMANENT TOLERABLE	
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If UNHCR, their partner NGOs, and states recognize camps as permanent entities, then 
these actors can begin discussing ways to make the camps more self-sustainable and 
tolerable for their residents. A crucial step toward achieving this goal is recognizing and 
promoting an absolute right to work for all camp residents. This step needs to occur at 
multiple levels. Most obviously, states must stop imposing restrictions on displaced 
people’s abilities to work. However the right to work issue is not merely a state problem. 
UNHCR, as the often default camp manager, needs to prioritize the right to work, 
particularly by allowing displaced people greater participation in the maintenance and 
running in camps. Despite an abundance of rhetoric to the contrary, UNHCR and partner 
NGOs have consistently been reluctant to incorporate displaced people into the 
maintenance and running of camps. Refugee participation, particularly refugee women 
participation, has historically been very low.  There are two factors that must be 107
remembered when engaging in a discussion about refugee participation: 1) as has already 
been articulated, camps are perceived as temporary. Under these circumstances, it is 
harder and there is less incentive, to make camps self-sustainable; and 2) that UNHCR 
and NGOs have a vested financial interest in limiting displaced people’s participation, as 
every job that is taken over by a camp resident is one that is taken away from a UN or 
NGO employee. 	

	
 Many states, particularly in the developing world, restrict employment of asylum 
seekers and other displaced people, largely out of the fear that such large numbers will be 
perceived to have a detrimental effect on their economy, and desire to discourage local 
integration.  They justify such restrictions on a number of legal grounds. While the right 108
to work is outlined in the 1951 convention, many states deny its provision to those in 
camps based on their lack of recognized refugee status. 	

The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
also grants the right to work, this time to a much larger category of individuals, as its 
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application is not limited to a recognized status. However there are several limitations to 
the ICESCR, that states use to justify employment limitations. 	

One such limitation is that most of the rights outlined in the ICESCR, including 
the right to work, are subject to progressive realization. This means that they need only be 
realized to the extent that the state in question is financially able. Many poor countries 
hosting camps argue that they do not have the financial resources to guarantee the right to 
work to their own citizens, let alone millions of others. 	

 	
 Another limitation on the applicability of the right to work to displaced people 
comes in article 2(3) of the ICESCR, which gives countries discretion regarding which 
economic rights they will extend to non-nationals. Developing states often invoke this 
article in defense of their denial of economic rights, including the right to work, to 
displaced people. 	

	
 Another potential barrier to the implementation of the right to work is that states 
are allowed to make reservations to the ICESCR. However, surprisingly few countries, 
and even fewer countries that host camps, have made reservations in regards to the right 
to work.  	
109
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A. The right to work in Refugee Law:	

Article 17 and 18 of the refugee convention are designed to extend employment rights to 
refugees, when such rights would otherwise be restricted to nationals. Article 17 states:	

The Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory 
the most favorable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the 
same circumstances, as regards to the right to engage in wage-earning 
employment. 	
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It goes on to say that restrictive measures imposed on aliens and their employment cannot 
be applied to one who has resided in the country for more than three years, or has a 
spouse or child processing the nationality of the host country. Furthermore, states must, 
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“give sympathetic consideration to assimilating the rights of all refugees with regard to 
wage-earning employment to those of nationals…”	

Regarding self-employment, Article 18 states:	

The contracting states shall accord to a refugee lawfully in their territory 
treatment as favorable as possible and, in any event, not less favorable than that 
accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the right to 
engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce and 
to establish commercial and industrial companies. 	
!
Most developed countries offer employment rights that are consistent with, or superior to 
those articulated in the convention for recognized refugees. Developing countries, 
however, are historically more likely to have reservations to the convention and 
implement restrictions of various severities on the right to work, even when it comes to 
recognized refugees.  	
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The drafters of the convention limited the right to work specifically to those 
“lawfully staying” in the territory of the host country. There is some debate about when 
an individual is “lawfully staying” in the country. The object and purpose of the 
convention would suggest that once an asylum seeker has been recognized, either as a 
convention refugee or granted some form of official temporary protection, their presence 
in the host country is lawful residence. However there is considerably more debate when 
it comes to unrecognized asylum seekers. Goodwin-Gill argues that asylum seekers must 
“have permanent, indefinite, or unrestricted or other residence status, recognition as a 
refugee, or issue of a travel document” to be considered “lawfully staying”. This is 
obviously quite restrictive and has been disputed by other scholars. Grahl-Madsen argues 
that “lawful stay” is the same as “lawful presence”, which applies to a stay lasting more 
than three months.  According to Hathaway, it is unreasonable to consider asylum 112
seekers’ residence unlawful until their status has been determined, as this would enable 
states to deny them their rights simply by refusing to verify their status. He therefore 
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suggests that “lawful status” is acquired once some form of recognition process has been 
initiated. e	
113
Determining which individuals in a camp are protected by articles 17 and 18 is 
difficult, largely because their status is not determined. While some in camps are 
recognized refugees, many are merely asylum seekers who have not begun the RSD 
process, and many more (particularly those fleeing natural disasters) stand no chance at 
being recognized as refugees under the convention. Goodwin-Gill describes four types of 
presence in a host country: simple presence, lawful presence, lawful residence, and 
habitual residence.  While some displaced people in camps may be considered lawfully 114
present (if they have begun or completed the RSD process) all camp residents are 
considered “simply present”, a status granted to them independent of their legal 
situation. 	
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Despite its prominence, the 1951 convention is not the only source of refugee law. 
Many countries hosting camps have signed refugee conventions expanding the 1951 
convention. By 1969 it had become clear to many African countries that the 1951 
convention did not address most of the kinds of migrants moving throughout the 
continent and thus they decided to draft an additional treaty dealing with refugees.  The 116
Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa (OAU convention) copies the 1951 convention refugee definition 
word for word, but then goes on to expand it:	

The term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public 
order in either part of the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is 
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compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.   	
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This expanded definition was designed to deal with people fleeing their countries due to 
aggression by another state, something Africa had seen a lot of since decolonization. 	
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 Central American states took an even broader approach to legally defining a 
“refugee” in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Cartagena declaration), which 
states:	

In view of the experience gained from the massive flows of refugees in the 
Central American area, it is necessary to consider enlarging the concept of a 
refugee…Hence the definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for the 
region is one which, in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, includes among refugees persons who have 
fled their country because their lives, safety, or freedom have been threatened by 
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of 
human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public 
order. 	
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While the Cartagena Declaration is not a legally binding treaty, its broad refugee 
definition is used by most Central American states when determining refugee status.  	
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 While neither the OAU Convention nor the Cartagena Declaration outline a right 
to work for refugees, both are meant to supplement the 1951 convention. This is 
supported by the Cartagena Declaration’s preamble, which states, “To ensure that the 
countries of the region establish a minimum standard of treatment for refugees, on the 
basis of the provisions of the 1951 Convention and 1976 Protocol and the American 
Convention of Human Rights…” 	
121
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According to this model, states that had signed either regional instrument and the 
1951 refugee convention should grant protections and rights outlined in the 1951 
convention, specifically the right to work, to all recognized refugees, regardless of the 
convention under which they were recognized. 	

Regardless of their status under IRL instruments, camp residents are still 
protected by International Human Rights Law (IHRL), whose protection is not limited to 
status recognition, and contains a wealth of employment rights. 	

!
B. The right to work in International Human Rights Law:	

Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, widely considered to be part of 
customary law , states, “Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, 122
to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.” 	
123
The right to work was further fleshed out in Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR ). Article 6 is legally 124
binding on states that have signed the ICESCR, which includes the majority of countries 
in the developed and developing worlds.	

The state parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which 
includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which 
he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this 
right. 	
125!
Article 2(2) of the ICESCR states that all the rights contained therein must be applied 
without discrimination on any grounds, including national origin. A country can therefore 
not deny an individual their rights under the ICESCR simply because that person is an 
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alien. Additionally, article 26 of the ICCPR further prohibits discrimination on any 
grounds (again, including nationality) and insists that the law protect them from such 
discrimination. According to Edwards, “Article 26 of the ICCPR extends non-
discrimination protection to socioeconomic rights of non-nationals.”  Thus, Edwards 126
concludes: 	

It is well-established that these standards [ICESCR employment rights] apply to 
non-nationals on an equal footing as nationals, although given the particular 
vulnerability of refugees and asylum-seekers such standards are not always 
observed. 	
127!
While most of the rights outlined in the ICESCR, including the right to work, are 
subject to progressive realization, as states claim, the ICESCR committee has stated that 
states have an obligation to “move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards 
the goal of the full realization of the rights in question.” Additionally, the committee 
recognized that, while most of the economic rights contained in the ICESCR may not be 
fully realized due to financial constraints, the protection against discrimination could be 
subject to no derogation. While poor states hosting camps might be able to defend low 
employment rates among displaced people on the basis of financial hardship, they would 
not be allowed to enact specific policies designed to limit the right to work when it came 
to displaced people in particular. 	

	
 As stated above, another barrier to the implementation of the right to work comes 
in article 2(3) of the ICESCR, which states, “Developing countries, with due regard to 
human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would 
guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals.”  128
While this statement appears to give states license to deny non-nationals an abundance of 
rights otherwise awarded to them in the covenant, it must be placed in context. According 
to Edwards, “while ambiguously worded, its [article 2(3)] purpose was to end the 
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domination of certain economic groups of non-nationals during colonial times. For this 
reason, it ought to be interpreted narrowly.”  	
129
Edwards goes on to argue that if a distinction between a national and a non-
national were to undermine the non-national’s basic rights, that distinction would not be 
legitimate. According to Fredriksson, “it can perhaps be argued that economic constraints 
may justify limiting some entitlements (such as welfare or health care) to citizens, but 
limiting employment-related benefits would not be supportable under this rationale”. 	

He goes on, “It is unreasonable to deny both the right to work and the right to 
access social security: this policy threatens to deter bona fide asylees with a well-founded 
fear of persecution from seeking protection…” 	
130
	
 Sometimes the 1951 refugee convention awards more rights to the displaced, and 
sometimes those people are better protected by IHRL. The right to work as outlined by 
the ICESCR applies to displaced people living in camps and the various limitations 
provided for in the convention do not justify state policy restricting camp residents’ right 
to work. Furthermore, those in camps have as much a need to work as do regular 
nationals of the host state. UNHCR has stated:	

It has become clear that a significant proportion of the world’s refugees (and 
asylum seekers) is destined to remain in their countries of asylum for long periods 
of time, due to the protracted nature of the conflicts which have forced them to 
leave their homeland. It has become equally clear that confining refugees to 
camps for years on end, deprived of the right to freedom of movement and 
without access to educational and income generating opportunities, has many 
negative consequences… 	
131!
Edwards adds, “The right to work is particularly important to refugees and asylum 
seekers as a means of survival and as a contribution to their sense of dignity and self-
worth.”  	
132
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Displaced people residing in camps are legally entitled to a right to work. While 
not all camp residents are recognized refugees, those that are under the 1951 convention 
or regional instruments, are entitled to a right to work under the 1951 convention. Even 
those not recognized as refugees cannot be denied access to employment under IHRL, 
particularly the ICESCR. There is therefore no legal right for countries hosting camps to 
actively prevent camp residents from seeking employment. As has been pointed out, 
confining displaced people to camps often creates this exact situation, as there are few, if 
any, employment options in camps. However the government’s decision to confine 
displaced people to camps cannot function as an excuse to deny them further rights. 	

State governments are obligated to, at the very least, allow camp residents to 
access employment. The realization of this process could take various shapes: states 
could choose to construct camps in more hospitable environments, where their residents 
would be able to farm the land. Alternatively states could invest in employment 
opportunities within the camp itself, such as facilitating small, refugee-created businesses 
(such as craft making) access to larger markets. Most extreme, as it would alter the way 
closed camps function, states could enable camp residents to seek employment outside 
the camp, in urban areas, while still requiring them to maintain their residence in the 
camp. 	

!
C. Benefits of allowing displaced people access to employment:	

It is in the best interest of states to allow camp residents to work and thus contribute to 
the state’s economy. There is significant evidence from the few developing states that do 
allow displaced people to work that suggests that they benefit greatly. The Thai 
government, for example, created a formal migrant work program in the 1990s, that 
employed approximately 1.3 million Burmese migrants, many of whom were displaced 
people. Additionally, an estimated 1-1.5 million Burmese displaced people continued to 
work unofficially. The result was a sharp reduction in poverty in the rural communities in 
which the majority of the migrants worked. In 1997, when a financial crisis hit Asia and 
the government deported large numbers of Burmese displaced people, there was a sharp 
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increase in the number of bankruptcies in the areas where they had worked.  Such data 133
shows that these migrants and refugees benefited the economy and that it suffered when 
they left the country. 	

In another example, since 2008 Ecuador has implemented a policy that allows 
refugees to work on an equal basis with nationals. Since that date, Ecuador has 
experienced steady economic growth. Similarly, Vietnamese refugees in Australia have 
contributed to a growth in trade between the two countries, boosting both economies. 	
134
Displaced people also often bring with them knowledge and skills that can 
contribute to the economies of their countries of asylum. Displaced people in Guinea for 
example, knew how to grow swamp rice, and were thus able to make use of land that had 
previously been considered un-farmable. Displaced people in Nepal have introduced new 
techniques of growing Cardamom, increasing productivity of an already profitable 
crop.  In sum:	
135
The human capital ‘windfall’ that refugees offer is maximized when refugees are 
able to travel to urban centers where jobs are more readily available. Host 
communities reap economic benefits in the form of new jobs and increased tax 
revenue that significantly outweigh the costs of additional social services and 
environmental protection measures. Refugees who work purchase goods and 
services, re-circulating money and benefitting host economies by increasing local 
demand. 	
136!
Furthermore, by allowing displaced people to work, the host state benefits from skills and 
training in which it did not invest (as the majority of displaced people would have 
received such training in their home countries).  Importantly, evidence shows that the 137
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host state reaps these benefits whether or not the displaced people integrate locally, are 
resettled to a third country, or return to their homes.  	
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 States often voice concern that allowing displaced people to work will detract 
from the local economy and encourage such individuals to remain in the country of 
asylum, however there is little evidence to support this. Displaced people are an entire 
labor force complete with skills in which the state did not have to invest. And given that 
those who do not work are completely reliant on aid, from the host state or UNHCR and 
partners, their unemployment can be extremely costly for states. Their contribution to the 
economy and self-sufficiency provides far more benefit than harm to the economies of 
host countries. Host countries’ economies benefit and displaced people are able to use 
their skills and financially support themselves, “Policies that forbid refugee employment 
force skilled individuals into idleness; policies that permit refugee employment allow 
those individuals to maintain their skills and contribute the fruits of their training to their 
host nation.” 	
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Furthermore, when it is possible to return home, displaced people are more likely 
to do so if they have some financial security. This is particularly true in cases where 
people have fled natural disasters (as in the case of many camp residents). Displaced 
people have often lost their homes and been forced to leave all their belongings behind. 
In the event their home countries stabilize they are less likely to return if they have spent 
years living on foreign aid and have a lot less than they had during their original flight.  140
They would be far more willing to return if they have spent their time in the host country 
working and saving enough money to rebuild their homes and lives upon their return.  	
141
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D. UNHCR and International Law:	
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States are obligated to promote the realization of the right to work under IHRL and IRL. 
At the very least states who have signed the ICESCR, and not entered reservations to 
article 6, would be under an obligation not to deliberately prevent displaced people from 
working. However they are not the only players who have a duty and ability to promote 
the right to work in camps. Many states turn over the running and maintenance of camps 
to UNHCR when they are unwilling or financially unable to run them themselves. In 
situations like these, UNHCR functions as the de facto sovereign over the camp:  	
142
UNHCR invariably functions as a surrogate state; not only does it act to ensure 
the population’s well-being by engaging security, arranging food distribution, and 
organizing health and educational facilities, it also establishes camp bylaws and 
curfews, and controls entry to and exit from the camp. Indeed, UNHCR and its 
implementing partners assume public powers that would normally be exercised by 
the host state.  	
143!
While international law has historically applied only to states, it is now generally 
accepted that certain other entities, particularly international organizations, can be bound 
by international law.  Any state or international organization’s obligations under 144
international law stem from its possession of international personality. If a state or 
international organization possesses legal personality, they are responsible or liable for 
the non-fulfillment of their obligations.  “A legal person is ‘a right-and-duty bearing 145
unit’ and legal personality is ‘the capacity of being subject of legal duties and legal rights, 
of performing legal transactions and of suing and being sued at law’.  Ralph Wilde, 146
Guglielmo Verdirame, and Maja Janmyr have all articulated arguments as to why 
UNHCR possesses international legal personality and therefore has duties and obligations 
under international law. 	

	
 In the 1949 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 
case, the ICJ decided that the UN had international personality. It reached this decision 
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based on the raison d’etre and modus operandi of the UN.  The court stated that the UN 147
was, “intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and 
rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of 
international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane”  and 148
was therefore, “a subject of international law and capable of possessing international 
rights and duties and… has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international 
claims.” 	
149
The Reparations case made it clear that the UN possessed international 
personality. The next question is does that personality extend to UNHCR, either as a child 
organization of the UN or as an independent organization. If UNHCR is considered 
merely a subsidiary organ, than responsibility for violations of international law would 
not be attributed to it, but rather to the UN as a whole. However, if UNHCR is an 
independent international organization, then it incurs its own obligations and duties for 
which it is responsible. 	

	
 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations (VCLTSIO) defines an 
international organization as an “intergovernmental organization”, a definition that would 
preclude UNHCR from being considered an international organization. However in 2009 
the International Law Commission (ILC), in their Articles on the Responsibility of 
International organizations (ARIO), defined an international organization as:	

An organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by 
international law and possessing its own international legal personality. 
International organizations may include as members, in addition to states, other 
entities. 	
150!
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This definition clearly includes UNHCR. Furthermore, Wilde, Verdirame, and Janmyr 
have all argued that UNHCR, while a subsidiary of the UN, operates independently of 
both its parent organization, and of its member states. According to Verdirame: 	

Autonomy is both a postulate and an effect of legal personality. In other words, 
international organizations deserve legal personality by virtue of being distinct 
from member states, but legal personality also becomes one of the ways in which 
they can maintain such distinction… 	
151!
	
 Janmyr and Verdirame argue that UNHCR retains a large amount of independence 
from the General Assembly (GA). The ICJ’s Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by 
the UN Administrative Tribunal advisory opinion implied that it was possible for the GA 
to create an organization so independent that it could actually bind the GA itself.  152
Janmyr points out that UNHCR generally possesses complete control over its activities 
and that the GA’s oversight, in reality, is extremely limited.  Furthermore, UNHCR’s 153
mandate to provide “international protection” requires the organization to be able to 
assert claims on behalf of those for whom it is responsible.  Thus, Janmyr concludes, 154
“while UNHCR in theory is subordinated to the UN General Assembly, it also appears as 
if the General Assembly intended that UNHCR act relatively unassisted on the 
international plane.” 	
155
	
 Another important point is that UNHCR is largely independent of its member 
states. According to Verdirame, “An autonomous institution is one that possesses a will 
distinct from that of its member states and can act independently of them.”  Studies of 156
UNHCR have demonstrated several instances where the organization has acted 
independently, even against the will, of its member states.  Additionally, while UNHCR 157
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does receive the majority of its funding from a few wealthy member states, the European 
Court of Human Rights has nonetheless described UNHCR as a body “whose 
independence, reliability and objectivity are, in the court’s view, beyond doubt.” Based 
on its independence from the UN and its member states, UNCHR is an individual 
international organization. As such, it possesses international legal personality and is 
bound by international law. 	

	
 Having established UNHCR’s legal personality, the next step is to determine what 
specific obligations they possess under international law. The advisory opinion in the 
Interpretation of Agreement of March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, stated:	

International organizations are subjects of international law, and, as such, are 
bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of 
international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to 
which they are parties. 	
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This means that UNHCR, as an international organization, is bound by customary 
international law, as well as principles of jus cogens, the UN charter, and its own 
mandate:  	
159
“The European Court of Justice has explicitly found that customary international 
law binds the EU/EC. This would mean that a significant part of human rights law 
and international humanitarian law binds UNHCR through custom.” 	
160!
E. UNHCR, the right to work, and displaced people’s participation:	

As has previously been outlined, the right to work is clearly embodied in the ICESCR. In 
UNHCR’s mission statement it lists, “encouraging respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” as one part of its mandate. Additionally, UNHCR, as part of the 
UN, is legally bound by the UN charter.  Article 55 of the charter states, “…the United 161
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Nations shall promote… higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development”  	
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Furthermore, UNHCR itself has made repeated statements emphasizing the 
importance of both refugee participation and self-sustainability when it comes to camps. 
Their handbook on emergencies, which lays out guidelines for the creation and 
maintenance of camps states:	

Most refugee operations last much longer than initially anticipated, therefore cost-
effective and sustainable infrastructure and shelter should be planned from the 
start…the refugees themselves must be involved as early as possible; ideally, the 
needs of the refugees should determine the location, size and layout of the site. 	
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Since 2006, UNHCR has actively pursued a policy of self-reliance regarding all displaced 
persons. Their handbook for self-reliance says in its introduction:	

Self-reliant refugees are more likely to achieve durable solutions. This is why the 
promotion of self-reliance is an integral component of UNHCR’s Framework for 
Durable Solutions for Displaced Persons. The Framework is based on the 
realization that the protection provided to refugees and other displaced persons by 
UNHCR and its partners can be effective only if material assistance is directed 
towards enhancing self-reliance and empowering refugees 	
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UNHCR’s obligations under IHRL and the UN declaration, combined with their own 
statements about promoting self-reliance and sustainability create an obligation 
incumbent upon them to promote self-reliance, sustainability, and the right to work. 
Importantly, given UNHCR’s own statement and their extensive mandate applying to far 
more individuals than are legally considered refugees, this obligation extends to all those 
under UNHCR’s care, particularly those in camps. 	

	
 However despite UNHCR’s obligation and self-stated intention to promote self-
reliance and sustainability, refugee participation in camp maintenance and life has an 
abysmally poor history, “Refugee participation probably has the worst ratio of rhetoric to 
reality of any concept in the refugee field.” 	
165
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Frederick Cuny, president of the Refugee Policy Group, has argued,	

The principal reason why refugees are not more involved in meaningful 
participatory activities is that relief agencies and the international organizations 
do not view themselves as being accountable to the refugees but rather to their 
donors and to the host country. Because the agencies do not feel themselves 
accountable, there are no effective corrective mechanisms through which refugees 
can attain meaningful participation, nor councils wherein they can demand a 
greater say in their own affairs. In short, refugees are left at the mercy and whims 
of assisting agencies. 	
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Additionally, aid agencies often refuse to formally hire displaced people and pay them for 
their contributions to the camp, preferring to insist that their participation be on a 
voluntary basis. Thus, camp residents are unable to accumulate any currency that would 
enable to them to provide for themselves and their families, and are therefore less likely 
to work in the long term.  	
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 Admittedly another obstacle to the hiring of displaced people to maintain camps is 
that the host state often imposes limits on such participation. As part of their original 
agreements with UNHCR, states often require certain types of jobs be filled by either 
expatriate or local workers. UNHCR, faced with the dilemma of either employing local 
and expatriate staff and gaining entry to the country or insisting on employing displaced 
people (an idea they were never keen on to begin with) and not being allowed to operate 
in the country, almost always choose the former. 	
168
	
 While state opposition is a concern, there is another, less obvious barrier to 
refugee participation; and that is UNHCR itself. Aid organizations and UNHCR benefit 
from providing services in camps, as it is easier to solicit donations when they can 
present specific causes. Such opportunities enable them to publicize their work 
internationally, thereby increasing their prominence and soliciting further donations.  169
UNHCR is thus engaged in a business of development and camp maintenance. While 
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they are not a for-profit company, they do have a vested interest in providing employment 
and growth for the humanitarian industry. And without people to save, there would be no 
need for the saviors. Taking on the running of camps means they need to solicit donations 
to complete the task. This also offers an opportunity to showcase their work as well as 
employ more staff and increases their operations. And the more activities they take on, 
the more donations they can require. 	

And yet despite this constant promotion and fundraising, UNHCR constantly cites 
limited resources as barriers to success. Therefore the question of how they spend the 
money they do receive must be raised. UNCHR has stated that the reason they cannot pay 
displaced people to work in camps is that they do not have the funds to do so.  And yet 170
they do have funds to employ foreign staff. 	

UN salaries for entry-level UN field service employees range from $31,000 to 
$54,000 per year and salaries for senior level professionals reach up to $90,000 per year. 
These salaries are also usually untaxed. Additionally, salaries are supplemented by a post 
adjustment, whose amount varies depending on cost of living at the duty station and 
exchange rate of the US dollar. For example, field service positions in Ethiopia would 
pay, with post adjustments included, total annual salaries range from $45,182 to $60,222 
for entry-level positions, and reach $105,691 senior positions. Staff members are often 
also awarded benefits, such as living allowances , dependency allowances (for those 171
traveling with families), health insurance, travel expenses covering travel to and from the 
duty station, and additional hazard pay (approx. $1365/month for international staff) for 
working in conflict zones.  While such salaries may not seem exorbitantly high, they do 172
amount to more money than UNHCR would have to spend were they employing 
displaced people to run the camps. 	

There is a disturbing irony to UNHCR paying foreign wages to foreign staff, 
flying such foreign staff into countries with camps, and paying living expenses for those 
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staff, and then claiming they cannot pay local wages (which, when calculating exchange 
rates for foreign currencies in poor countries, would be minuscule) to those already living 
in local camp housing. While millions of dollars are funneled into UNHCR for the 
support of its “humanitarian” activities, much of that money goes to paying western 
wages and supporting western life styles of western staff. The result is that the 
organization appears constantly underfunded and unable to fulfill its goals with regard to 
its projects. This cycle needs to change, largely by reducing UNHCR activities and 
transferring jobs previously held by UNHCR staff to displaced people. 	

Making camps 100% self-sufficient, with no expatriate staff involvement, is not 
possible. Refugee communities may not bring certain specialized skills with them and 
certain positions, such as IRL/IHRL legal experts or experienced camp managers from 
abroad will still be needed. However such jobs are far fewer than the number of positions 
usually filled by foreign staff. There is no need for expatriates to be building shelters and 
running food stations when these tasks could be completed by camp residents. 	

	
 Employing displaced people would have a large, positive impact on their 
psychological condition. Psychologists have pointed out that participation, “builds self-
esteem, rebuilds self-confidence, reduces feelings of isolation and reduces lethargy, 
depression, and despondency.”  It would also return a sense of identity and agency to 173
male camp residents, helping to reduce the rate of GBV. 	

Furthermore, participation is cost effective, for both UNHCR and host states. If 
camps were sustained by their inhabitants and UNHCR’s activities were reduced, the 
organization would not find itself in its seemingly permanent “under-funded” status. 
Furthermore, states would be less burdened financially because they would be expected 
to contribute less to camps. Participation also promotes a primary goal of UNCHR: 
protection: 	

Internal protection problems are usually due as much to people’s feelings of 
isolation, frustration, and lack of belonging to a structured society as they are to 
any other form of social problem…By giving people a sense of worth, a sense of 
control over their own lives, and by building a community to which people feel 
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responsible about community affairs, the groundwork is laid for a bonding of the 
community which will reduce protection incidents. 	
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Lastly, participation gives displaced people better opportunities in the future, regardless 
of what durable solution they eventually experience. Displaced people who have been 
able to work and accumulate some savings will be less dependent on financial assistance 
from resettlement countries, therefore increasing the chances that those countries will 
take them.  They will also have a greater chance at integrating into their host country if 175
they have formed some sense of community and purpose. And, if their countries of origin 
do become safe for return, they will be more likely to go back if they have had the 
opportunity to work and possess the financial resources to rebuild their lives upon their 
return. It is therefore in the best interest of all parties involved: displaced people, 
UNHCR and partners, host states, and resettlement states, to encourage the overall right 
to work for displaced people. 	

States and UNHCR have obligations, prescribed by international law or individual 
mandate, to promote the right to work. Whilst active policy to promote this right may be 
financially unfeasible (particularly for states) they both must, at the very least, stop 
deliberately preventing displaced people from realizing their right to work. The exact 
details of the implementation of such a plan are beyond the scope of this thesis; however, 
on a general level, UNHCR and their NGO partners must actively reduce their activities 
and focus more on training displaced people and enabling them to maintain their camps. 
Displaced people who could not find work maintaining the camps should be encouraged 
to engage in other employment activities in the camp, such as crafts business, farming, 
and so on. And lastly, the host state must allow displaced people who cannot find work in 
either of the previously mentioned sectors to leave the camps and seek work in urban 
areas. 	
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 While financial security is not grounds for resettlement, many Western states are 175
concerned with the taxes on welfare systems brought by incoming refugees. If such refugees 
were less dependent, states might be more willing to grant resettlement. 
V. CONCLUSION 	
!
Many camps are often notoriously inhumane places. Women and children in particular 
are in danger of being raped and/or physically abused. Sites of horrendous violence, 
camps often seem chaotic, lawless places in which exceptional violence is a result of such 
disorder. However much of the violence, particularly GBV, in camps is anything but 
disordered. Rather, it is, in part, the direct result of a network of laws and policies that 
control every aspect of camp residents’ lives and reduce them to a state of utter 
dependence. Such laws and policies are no accident. Rather, they are direct tools 
implemented to keep Third World displaced people from the developed world. 	

	
 Since the end of the Cold War, bloody conflicts in the Third World have continued 
to rage, driving millions from their homes and across international borders. Determined 
to confine these masses to their regions, Western states have constructed barriers, built 
from the bricks of restrictive visa policies, the promotion of voluntary repatriation, and 
camps. As a result, millions of displaced people are caught in a perpetual state of turmoil; 
prevented from returning to their homes and barred from accessing the West by a 
figurative, and often literal, wall. 	

The developed states’ plan should not be condoned and should be constantly 
challenged. However, it must also be recognized as an unfortunate reality. If the 
confinement of displaced people to their regions is recognized as a permanent situation, 
then ways of making the means of confinement more humane should be explored. The 
method does not have to be closed camps that leave their residents languishing in 
permanent states of dependence and vulnerability.	

	
 Current camp structures usually prevent displaced people from leaving the camp, 
and providing for themselves, forcing them to rely entirely on UNHCR and their partner 
NGOs for every aspect of survival. While this may suit UNHCR and partners, it has a 
catastrophic effect on the physical and psychological welfare of the individuals such 
organizations are mandated to protect. Deprived of all sense of agency and their identity 
as breadwinners, male displaced people often resort to violence of all types, particularly 
victimizing women and children. Such policies also have a destructive effect on female 
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displaced people, who often find themselves unable to provide for themselves and their 
children and therefore dependent on abusive partners. 	

	
 While such facts are the current reality, they do not have to be. If some form of 
camps is recognized as permanent phenomena, then there is an incentive to make them 
self-sustainable and tolerable. Both UNHCR and host states have obligations respectively 
under their personal mandate and international law to promote and facilitate the right to 
work for displaced people under their care. By turning over the majority of camp 
maintenance positions to displaced people, UNHCR would cut down on the massive 
expenses it never seems to be able to afford and could more effectively promote their 
mandate to protect the displaced. States, by facilitating the employment of displaced 
people inside and outside of camps, could benefit from their contributions to the local 
economy, and also save itself precious financial resources it cannot afford to spend on 
camp maintenance. And most importantly, such policies would serve as a large step 
toward improving the mental state of displaced people and reducing GBV. In this way, 
women and children could move out of their permanent place of peril and into a more 
humane environment. 	
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